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BIANNUAL SURVEY
Telefilm Sales, Inc. v. United Artists Corp.1 40 The complaint
alleged that defendant had misappropriated plaintiff's common-law
property rights, which were grounded on a written agreement
with a third party concerning a motion picture film. The appellate
division held that the complaint failed to comply with CPLR 3013
in that it did not allege what constituted the rights of the licensor
to the film, whether the public was deceived or confused, or any
indication that the film was not in the public domain. The court
indicated that because of the unsettled state of the law with
respect to republication of motion pictures, the pleadings should
be sufficiently particular to apprise the court and the adverse party
of the precise problem involved.
It is essential for the practitioner to realize that while the
courts will construe pleadings in conformity with the liberal
philosophy of the CPLR, they will not uphold a pleading which
fails to indicate that the plaintiff is entitled to recover on some
legal theory. Liberalized rules are not an excuse for poorly-
drawn or sloppy pleadings. To comply with CPLR 3013, a
pleading must be drawn up with sufficient precision to enable
the parties to adequately prepare their cases and to enable the
court to control the case.
Sham no longer ground for dismissal of irrelevant matter.
In a recent case, the Oneida Special Term granted plaintiff's
motion to dismiss an affirmative defense and certain denials
contained in an answer on the ground of sham. The appellate
division, upon review, ruled that "there is no longer a motion
to strike as sham under the CPLR." 150 Accordingly, they reversed
special term as to the denials in the answer. However, since the
affirmative defense alleged "no facts . . . sufficient in law," 151
it fell within the province of a 3211(b) motion (failure to state
a defense) and the dismissal was upheld on that ground.
The appellate division's ruling is consistent with the letter
and intent of the CPLR. Rule 103 of the Rules of Civil Practice,
which permitted a motion to strike specific matter from a
pleading on the ground that it was a sham, 5 2 was superseded by
3024(b) of the CPLR, 53 which permits the striking of only
scandalous or prejudicial matter unnecessarily inserted in the plead-
ing. Apparently the striking of matter from a pleading for any
other purpose has been eliminated by the CPLR.
21922 App. Div. 2d 778, 254 N.Y.S2d 36 (1st Dep't 1964).
150 Chicago Dressed Beef Co. v. Gold Medal Packing Corp., 22 App. Div.
2d 1010, 254 N.Y.S.2d 717 (4th Dep't 1964).
'
5 1
rd. at 1010, 254 N.Y.S.2d at 718.
252See PRAsnxm & TRAtANI, Naw Yoim PRAcricE 449 (4th ed. 1959).
Rule 104 is the rule which authorized the striking of the whole answer or
reply.153 Rule 104 of the RCP has been omitted in the CPLR.
195]
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If the pleadings are truly defective, a motion pursuant to
3211 or 3212 will lie to dismiss the entire pleading or defense.
In other words, if the "sham" goes to the heart of the allegation,
the entire pleading will be dismissed, but if the "sham" affects
only an insignificant portion of the pleading, the court will not
entertain a motion to dismiss that portion unless it falls within
the limited scope of 3024(b).
Protracted delay in amending bill of particulars causes costs, both
of the appeal and of the case to date, to be assessed
against a successful plaintiff.
In Silverman v. Ashe' 54 the plaintiff moved to amend his bill
of particulars during the trial, two years after that bill had been
served. The fact to be added was ascertainable at the time the
bill was served, but was omitted due to an oversight by plaintiff's
counsel.
The supreme court, special term, granted plaintiff's motion
to amend. The appellate division modified that order and, using
its discretion,'55 assessed both costs of the appeal and of the case
to that date against plaintiff. This case indicates that amendments
will be freely granted although the delay be unreasonably long, 56
subject to an assessment of costs.
Pleading dismissed for failure to itemize special damages in
counterclaim based on prima facie tort and defamation.
General damages are those damages that are the necessary
result of a wrong or injury. While special damages are the
natural result of a wrong or injury, they are not deemed to be
a necessary effect.' 57  The difference between the two is well
established. Historically, while a non-specific indication of general
damages sufficed, special damages had to be specifically pleaded to
avoid surprise.
CPLR 3015(d) codified prior existing case law by requiring
that special damages be itemized., 8  There has been some dispute
as to the value of this provision. Professors Weinstein, Korn
and Miller desire strict compliance with the CPLR provision.'"
On the other hand, Professor Siegel, in his commentaries on
15422 App. Div. 2d 659, 253 N.Y.S.2d 137 (Ist Dep't 1964).
155 CPLR 8107.
' 
5 For another indication of the liberal approach taken with respect
to the bill of particulars see The Biannual Survey of Newt York Practice,
39 ST. JoiN's L. REV. 209-10 (1964).
'57 CLARK, NEW YORK LAW Op DAMAGES § 3 (1925).
158 For further development of the area see The Biannual Survey of
New York Practice, 38 ST. JOHN'S L. REv. 406, 425-27 (1964).
159 3 WEINSTIN, KORN & MiLLER, NEW YORK Civu. PRAccz f 3015.17
(1963).
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